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Abstract— This paper aims to analyze transient security 
and dependability of a vulnerable critical system, under 
vulnerability-related attack and two reactive defense 
strategies, from a severe vulnerability announcement until 
the vulnerability is fully removed from the system. By severe, 
we mean that the vulnerability-based malware could cause 
significant damage to the infected system in terms of 
security and dependability while infecting more and more 
new vulnerable computer systems. We propose a Markov 
chain-based survivability model for capturing the 
vulnerable critical system behaviors during the 
vulnerability elimination process. A high-level formalism 
based on Stochastic Reward Nets is applied to automatically 
generate and solve the survivability model. Survivability 
metrics are defined to quantify system attributes. The 
proposed model and metrics not only enable us to 
quantitatively assess the system survivability in terms of 
security risk and dependability, but also provide insights on 
the system investment decision. Numerical experiments are 
constructed to study the impact of key parameters on system 
security, dependability and profit. 
Keywords— Reactive defense strategy; Quantitative analysis; 
Stochastic Reward Nets; Survivability; Security 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A software vulnerability is a defect in software which can be 
exploited by attackers/malwares (malicious software) to 
compromise a system for their benefits. A typical malware goes 
through the following four phases: (1) gaining access to a 
targeted system by means of the declaimed vulnerabilities, (2) 
trying various methods to make itself persistent into the system, 
(3) looking for data of interest to be stolen or modified, and (4) 
damaging security by modifying unauthorized data, exfiltrating 
sensitive data, or infecting new vulnerable computer systems 
(denoted as host in the following). In addition, the various 
activities undertaken during the attack may crash the system and 
then degrade system dependability. The security and/or 
dependability damage may lead to loss of customer confidence 
and lead to the other possible long-term consequences due to loss 
and theft of information.  
In this paper, we assess the survivability of a vulnerable 
critical system from a severe vulnerability announcement until 
the vulnerability is fully removed from the system. We define 
survivability as a transient measure of a system’s capability in 
withstanding vulnerability-related malicious attacks and 
executing pre-specified mission even when parts of the system 
are damaged. By severe, we mean the vulnerability-based 
malware could cause significant damage to the infected system 
in terms of security and dependability while infecting new 
vulnerable computer systems.  
We develop a survivability model to capture the system 
behaviors under reactive defense strategies and the actions 
performed by an attacker to cause such an attack by exploiting 
the vulnerability. All relevant event times are assumed to be 
exponentially distributed and thus the model is a homogeneous 
continuous time Markov chain (CTMC). In this paper, the 
generation and solution of the proposed Markov model are 
automated using a variant of stochastic Petri Nets called 
Stochastic Reward Nets (SRNs), which could easily represent 
common characteristics of computer systems such as 
concurrency, synchronization, conditional branches, looping, 
and sequencing.  
This paper is close to the work in [1]. The key differences 
from [1] are detailed in Section II. We summarize the major 
contributions of this paper as follows: 
(1) We investigate the scenario where two reactive defense 
strategies are deployed to reduce or prevent the security 
damage caused by malware. Moreover, we not only 
investigate the attacking activity of affecting the local 
system security, but also investigate the attacking 
activity of infecting new hosts.  
(2) We develop a survivability model by using Stochastic 
Reward Nets so as to capture the system behaviors. To 
the best of our knowledge, we are the first to apply 
state-space analytic model to analyze the survivability 
of such a vulnerable critical system. We also define 
survivability metrics and propose the corresponding 
calculating methods.  
(3) Numerical experiments are constructed to study the 
impact of key parameters on system security, 
dependability and profit. 
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Fig. 1 Flowchart depicting events in a system under an attack, after a vulnerability is announced and during the implementation and deployment of the reac-
tive defense strategies 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents related 
work. Section III presents the system model and survivability 
measures. In Section IV, we present evaluation results. The 
conclusion is drawn in Section V.  
II. RELATED WORK 
Kinds of efforts have been made to advance the improvement 
in the dependability and security of various infrastructure 
systems, including communication network, transportation, 
power and water distribution and so on. However, undesired 
events still occur to those systems. For example, natural disasters, 
security attacks and hardware/software failures. Timely and 
quick recovery from the unexpected events is critical to 
infrastructure systems. It is known that an undesirable event 
occurrence may only degrade the system performance instead of 
crashing the system.  
In the scenario where there are multiple actions to be taken 
for recovering the system, the recovery process could be 
modeled as a single-phase recovery model or a multi-phase 
recovery model. In the latter type, each recovery action or a set 
of parallel actions are modelled as a phase. Phase input 
determines the sequence of the phases. A multi-phase recovery 
model could capture the fine-grained characteristics of the 
restoration process [2][5], compared to a single-phase recovery 
model.  
Survivability, a transient measure, is defined to describe the 
ability of the system to recover a predefined service in a timely 
manner after the occurrence of undesired events [2]. Its 
quantitative analysis could help improve the systems’ capability 
in critical service provision when damage occurs to part of the 
system or the whole system get damaged. 
The tremendous increase in the number of vulnerabilities 
discovered and disclosed and the severity of their damage have 
prompted various research to the survivability modeling and 
analysis in various fields and from different perspectives [1][6][7] 
and the references therein. Recently, the authors in [1] carried 
out a quantitative assessment of the system secure survivability. 
There are three major differences between [1] and this paper: 
(1) Only one mitigation strategy, namely the patch 
implementation, is considered in [1]. This paper, besides 
patch strategy, also considers the isolation strategy to 
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separate vulnerable part in the infected system, which 
avoids vulnerability-related damage but may degrade 
system dependability and performance. 
(2) The security loss is quantified in terms of sojourn time in 
[1]. This paper proposes a new calculation method by in 
terms of the times of successfully stealing/modifying 
sensitive information. 
(3) The model proposed in this paper could capture the 
activities of infecting new vulnerable hosts.   
III. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND MODEL 
This section first overviews the system of interest in this 
paper. Then a Stochastic Reward Net model for survivability 
analysis of this system is presented. 
A. System Description 
We now describe the system considered in this paper, shown 
in Fig.1. It could be regarded as an extended system of [1]. There 
are nine system states: Vulnerable, Isolating, Patching, Fixing, 
Failing, Crashing, Infected, Lmoved, and Exfiltrated. Isolating and 
Patching denote two reactive defense strategies considered in 
this paper. All the assumptions made in [1] are applied in this 
paper, in order to highlight the differences of this paper from [1]. 
More assumptions are given in the following.  
When a vulnerability is fully disclosed, the system is in the 
Vulnerable state. Meanwhile, the attacker starts the exploit 
implementation. In addition, the defender designs and deploys 
the two reactive defense strategies. Thus, there are three 
rectangles in the second row of Fig.1, denoted by Isolation 
system, Patch implementation and Exploit code implementation, 
respectively. 
The shaded part denoted by System describes the system state 
changes under the attack actions and the two reactive defense 
strategies. After the isolating strategy is deployed, the attack 
could not degrade the system security but the system 
performance is degraded. When the patch is ready, it must be 
deployed into the system immediately and the system is 
recovered to a secure state. When the attacked system is in 
Lmoved or Exfiltrated state, the malware also could infect new 
vulnerable hosts which have not been infected before. System 
may fail or crash due to attacker behaviors or software bugs, such 
as Mandelbugs [8]. If the system crashes or fails, it must be fixed 
immediately even the isolation or patching strategy is ready to 
be deployed. In the fixing process, both the defender and the 
attacker can do nothing to the system.  
The metrics used to quantify survivability vary according to 
the system and system attributes of interest. We assume that as 
long as system service is provisioned, there is revenue. But 
revenue decreases after the isolation strategy is deployed or the 
malware enters into the vulnerable system. When system service 
cannot be provisioned, there may be economic loss to the service 
provider due to the pre-defined SLA (Service Level Agreement) 
with customers. In addition, both each successful infecting of a 
new vulnerable host and each successful stealing/modifying 
sensitive information could result in some loss to the service 
provider. We define profit equals total revenue minus total cost.  
The metrics considered in this paper include: 
• Metric 1m . Mean security loss of the local system at time 
t . 
• Metric 2m . Mean number of new infected hosts at time t . 
• Metric 3m . Mean accumulated security loss of the local 
system in the interval [0, t ]. 
• Metric 4m . Mean accumulated number of the new infected 
hosts in the interval [0, t ]. 
• Metric 5m . Mean accumulated cost in the interval [0, t ]. 
• Metric 6m . Mean accumulated revenue in the interval [0, t
]. 
• Metric 7m . Mean accumulated profit in the interval [0, t ]. 
Note that although the definitions of some metrics are same 
as in [3], the computation formulas are different. The first three 
metrics are transient metrics that capture the state of the 
system at time t after the occurrence of an undesired event. 
The left metrics are cumulative metrics which are expected 
accumulated rewards in the interval (0, t]. Note that 
survivability metrics are computed after the 
announcement of a vulnerability. In the remainder of this 
paper, time t refers to the time immediately after a severe 
vulnerability announcement and is measured in days.  
B. Stochastic Reward Net Model  
There are two major challenges for modeling the system: 
(1) How to model two attack activities which occur 
simultaneously. Namely, damaging the infected system 
security and infecting new vulnerable hosts.  
(2) How to model the priority of the patch-based defense 
strategy over that of the isolation-based defense strategy 
when both strategies are ready to be deployed.  
Fig.4 describes an SRN model for the survivability analysis. 
The shaded part is the extension to the model proposed in [1]. As 
in [1], survivability focuses on capturing the evolution of the 
system after an unexpected event occurs. Thus, the model in 
Fig.2 does not include the vulnerability detection process. 
TABLE I and II show the variable definitions and guard 
definitions, respectively. The following focuses on the 
explanation on the shaded part. The left part explanation is 
referred to [1]. 
 
 
  
 
  
Fig. 2 Stochastic Reward Net model 
 
When a software vulnerability is identified, one token is 
removed from vu lfoundP with rate δ and put in _vul sP , vulP ,
prepareP , and preisolateP each. This means that system failure, 
exploitation code implementation, patch implementation, and 
the vulnerability-related service isolation implementation occur 
parallelly. A token in place preisolateP denotes that the isolation 
strategy is under implementation. When isolateT  fires, one token 
is taken from preisolateP and one token is put in startisolateP , 
representing that the isolation strategy is ready for deployment. 
When there is a token respectively in startisolateP and vulP  
( repairP , exploitP , infectP , lmovP , or efilP ), the immediate transition 
1ct  ( 2ct , 3ct , 4ct , 5ct , or 6ct ) fires. Then, a token is taken from 
startisolateP and vulP  ( repairP , exploitP , infectP , lmovP , or efilP ) , and 
deposited in place finishisolateP . finishisolateP represents that the 
system is isolated from the malicious software. In this situation, 
the system may fail or crash. As long as there is a token in readyP , 
the system enters into the state of deploying the patch. 
The priority of 1t , 2ct and 7t is set as 1 2 7ct t t> > with the 
aim to achieve the following goals: whenever the patch strategy 
is available, the patch must be deployed immediately; then are 
the service isolation strategy and exploit code. Similarly, we set 
the priority: 2 1ct t> , 3 3ct t> , 4 4ct t> , 5 5ct t> , and 6 6ct t> . 
The activity of infecting a new vulnerable host is modeled by 
infectmP , infectmT , infectsP , infectst and infectmg . infectmg assures that 
only when there is a token in lmovP or efilP , a new vulnerable host 
may be infected. Before we define each metrics, some variables 
are defined first. We define a reward/loss to each place in Fig.2 
to represent the service revenue/loss at this place per day. vulr  /
Place
vulc  denotes the unit revenue/loss at vulP . The other places 
have similar revenue and loss definitions. Translmovc and 
Trans
infectmc  are 
defined to denote unit loss of throughput at lmovT and infectmT , 
respectively. Now we use the SPNP software package [9] to 
calculate the above metrics as follows: 
• 1m : throughput of lmovT  at time t . 
• 2m : throughput of infectmT  at time t . 
• 3m : the expected accumulated rate of infectmT in the in-
terval [0, t ]. 
• 4m : the expected accumulated rate of lmovT in the inter-
val [0, t ]. 
  
 
• 5m : 3m * Translmovc + 4m *
Trans
Infectmc + the sum of mean accu-
mulated loss of each place in the interval [0, t ]. 
• 6m : the sum of mean accumulated reward of each place 
in the interval [0, t ]. 
• 7 6 5m m m= − . 
 
IV. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS  
This section aims to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
proposed model. We evaluate our model solutions obtained by 
using SPNP software package [9] to solve the SRN model, in 
terms of the metrics described in Section III.B. Parameter values 
are set as in [1], also given in TABLE I.  
We first investigate the effect of prepareλ on security loss. 
The other parameter values are fixed as in TABLE I. Fig.3-Fig.6 
plot these results. P10, P12, P16, and P20 represent the results of 
1
prepareλ  = 10 days, 12 days, 16 days, 20 days respectively. 
We observe:  
• Fig.3 indicates that for each 1
prepareλ , the throughput 
of damaging the local system security increases first and 
then decreases. The increasing throughput is due to the in-
creasing probability that lmovP  has a token. But this in-
crease stops at some time. The decreasing throughput is 
due to the increasing probability that the isolation and/or 
patch-based defense strategies are ready for deploy-
ment. Similar explanation could be applied for the 
changes in the throughput of infecting new hosts, shown 
in Fig.5.  
• With the increasing mean days ( 1
prepareλ ) for the patch 
implementation, the probability that the patch-based de-
fense strategy is ready for deployment  increases 
slowly. Therefore, more security damage is caused. 
Fig.3 indicates the throughputs of P20, P16, P12 and P10 
at the same time instant are increasing. 
• With the increasing mean days ( 1
prepareλ ) for the patch 
implementation, much more local security damage is 
caused and there are more number of new hosts to be in-
fected, shown in Fig.4 and Fig.6, respectively.  
We also do experiments by fixing 1
prepareλ =20 days and 
varying isolateλ . Due to space limitation, we only present results 
of Times of successfully damaging local system security at time 
t in Fig.7. “i8” and “i16” represent the results of 1
isolateλ  = 8 
days and 16 days, respectively. “i0” represents that there is no 
isolation strategy deployment. We observe that with the 
increasing mean days for the isolation implementation, there is 
more mean sojourn time for malware to launch attack to local 
system. Then more security damage is generated. 
 
TABLE I. PARAMETER DEFINITION 
Symbol Definition Mean value 
1 / δ  Mean time that the discovered vul-nerability is known to all 
30 mins 
1 / prepareλ
 
Mean time for implementing a patch 20 days 
1 / deployλ
 
Mean time for deploying the patch 12days 
1 / vulnλ  
Mean time for generating the exploit 
code by an attacker 
4 days 
1 / failλ  Mean time that the computer system fails 
365 days 
1 / fixλ  Mean time that the computer system completes the failure or crash fixing 
2 days 
1 / exploitλ
 
Mean time for injecting the exploit 
code into the system 
7 days 
1 / infλ  Mean time that the exploit code is persistent 
1 days 
1 / lmovλ  Mean time that the attacker finds sen-sitive data of interest 
7 days 
1 / efilλ  Mean time that the attacker obtains the desired information 
2 days 
1 / isolateλ
 
Mean time for shutting down those 
services related to the detected vul-
nerability 
8 days 
1 / infectmλ
 
Mean time that the attacker injects 
the exploit code into another vulner-
able host 
7 days 
1ρ , 2ρ  Probability that the exploit code works in the system and is persistent, 
respectively 
0.9,0.9 
3ρ , 4ρ  Probability that the attacker finds its target and the desired information, 
respectively. 
0.9,0.9 
5ρ  Probability that the attacker infects a new host successfully. 
0.9 
 
TABLE II.  GUARD FUNCTIONS FOR THE SRN MODEL 
Guard Values 
vulg if (#( _vul sP )==1) then 1 else 0 
5fg if (#( vulP )==1) then 1 else 0 
infectmg  if (#( lmovP )==1 ||#( efilP )==1) then 1 else 0 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS  
This paper presents a CTMC model for survivability analysis 
of a critical system under a severe vulnerability. Stochastic 
Reward Nets was used to facilitate the generation and solution 
of the Markov model. We defined survivability metrics in terms 
of system dependability and security. In addition, numerical 
results were presented to study the impact of the underlying 
parameters on the system survivability. These results also 
provided insights on investment efforts in various system 
recovery strategies including reactive defense strategies. 
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Fig. 3 Times of successfully damaging local system security at time t 
under different prepareλ  
 
Fig. 4 Mean accumulated times of successfully damaging local 
system security by time t under different prepareλ  
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Fig. 5 Mean number of infected hosts at time t under different 
prepareλ  
 
Fig. 6 Mean accumulated number of infected hosts by time t under 
different prepareλ  
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Fig. 7 Times of successfully damaging local system security at 
time t under different isolateλ  
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